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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of a second successive petition for post-
conviction relief on the basis that the petition was untimely. Relief should be granted because 
the petition was not untimely. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
Per Oser v. State, Docket No. 39001 (Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2012), the following occurred: 
Oser was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine, LC. § 
37-2732B(a), and delivery of a controlled substance, LC. § 37-2732(a). He was 
sentenced to concurrent unified terms of twenty years, with minimum periods of 
confinement of six years. Oser appealed his judgment of conviction which was 
affirmed by this Court in an unpublished opinion. State v. Oser, Docket No. 
35228 (Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2009). On July 20, 2009, Oser filed a prose petition for 
post-conviction relief. Oser was appointed counsel to assist in his post-conviction 
action and counsel filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. After 
hearing oral argument, the district court granted the state's motion for summary 
dismissal of Oser's petition on June 23, 2010. Oser appealed the dismissal, but 
later withdrew such appeal voluntarily. On May 16, 2011, Oser filed a successive 
petition for post-conviction relief and requested the appointment of counsel. The 
state moved for summary dismissal of the successive petition. The district court 
denied Oser's request for appointment of counsel and granted the state's motion. 
Slip Op. p. 1. 
The Court of Appeals stated that the successive petition alleged that initial post-
conviction counsel had failed to adequately represent Mr. Oser in three respects: 1) failure to 
adequately address the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on the basis of relevance, 
foundation, and admissibility of certain specific statements on a recording; 2) failure to raise the 
issue of trial counsel's failure to impeach the state's witnesses; and 3) failure to raise the issue of 
trial counsel's failure to call certain witnesses. The petition also raised a new claim that the 
affidavit of probable cause in support of the search warrant does not exist or that it was obtained 
as a result of police misconduct. Slip Op. p. 2. 
The Court of Appeals found that the successive petition was untimely because Mr. Oser 
should have known of the ineffective assistance of original post-conviction counsel when the 
district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal of his claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel on June 23, 2010, but he did not file his successive petition until May 
16, 2011. The Court held this was an unreasonable amount of time between discovery and the 
filing of the successive petition. Id. The Court further held that the new claim regarding the 
affidavit of probable cause was known or should have been known at least by the time the direct 
appeal ended on February 18, 2009. The Court noted that Mr. Oser did not assert any reason why 
the claim was not raised in the initial petition and so it could not be raised in a successive 
petition. Slip Op. p. 3. 
The Court of Appeals did not note in its opinion that Mr. Oser had filed his successive 
petition less than one month after he voluntarily withdrew the appeal from the summary 
dismissal of the original petition. R 40. 
Mr. Oser filed the second successive petition at issue in this case on April 8, 2013, 
approximately seven months after the remittitur in the appeal from the first successive petition 
was issued. R 4. 
The second successive petition raised the same claims as raised in the first successive 
petition. R 6. However, Mr. Oser supported this new petition with the affidavits of Eric 
Fredericksen and Erik Lehtinen. R 33-43. 
Mr. Fredericksen attested that he had represented Mr. Oser in the direct appeal and in the 
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appeal from the dismissal of the initial petition. Mr. Fredericksen further attested that he could 
not identify any meritorious issues in the appeal from the dismissal of the initial petition. He 
discussed the case with Mr. Oser and identified the deficiencies in the initial petition. He 
explained that to remedy the deficiencies and to raise additional issues that had not been 
presented, Mr. Oser would have to file a successive petition. He further advised Mr. Oser that to 
be considered timely the successive petition would have to be filed within a reasonable time of 
the conclusion of his appeal. Mr. Fredericksen lastly attested that in January 2011, SAPD moved 
to withdraw from the appeal of the successive petition and advised Mr. Oser that ifhe proceeded 
with the appeal, he could be subject to sanctions. In April of 2011, Mr. Oser voluntarily 
dismissed the appeal. R 36-37. 
Mr. Lehtinen attested that as Chief of the Appellate Unit, he was familiar with Mr. Oser's 
appeals. He attested that in his opinion, Mr. Fredericksen's explanation to Mr. Oser regarding 
his cases was correct. He further attested that Mr. Fredericksen represented Mr. Oser in the 
appeal from the summary dismissal of the successive petition and that Mr. Lehtinen was 
surprised that the Court of Appeals in the successive petition appeal had measured the time 
period for the "reasonable time" analysis from the date that the original petition was summarily 
dismissed instead of the date that the original post-conviction appeal was terminated pursuant to 
Mr. Oser's motion for voluntary dismissal. R 39-43. Mr. Lehtinen concluded: 
If Mr. Oser is ultimately deprived of the opportunity to obtain post-conviction 
relief simply because he chose to conserve the State's resources by dismissing a 
frivolous appeal in favor of raising his claims through a more appropriate 
vehicle-a successive petition -from this point forward, SAPD attorneys will be in 
the position of having to advise clients to proceed with their frivolous post-
conviction appeals prose (after SAPD withdraws), simply to obtain the benefit of 
the rule set forth in Hernandez [v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799 (Ct. App. 1999)]. In 
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R43. 
my opinion, this would not only be a tragic waste of resources, but it would leave 
SAPD attorneys in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between the 
duty of zealous representation, see e.g., I.R.C.P. Preamble cmt. 2, and the duty to 
not waste the court's resources, see e.g., ABA Standard 408.3(b), supra. 
The State filed an answer raising among other defenses that Mr. Oser's second successive 
petition was untimely. R 53-58. 
The district court then entered an order denying appointment of counsel and a notice of its 
intent to dismiss. R 59-63. 
Following the Court's notice, the State filed a motion for summary dismissal arguing that 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact and that 
the newly discovered evidence claim fails to meet the criteria of ICR 34, Idaho Code § 19-2406, 
and the test of State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976). The State further argued 
that the Brady claim fails to meet the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). R 
121-123. 
The State accompanied its motion with a brief, which argued not the grounds set out in its 
motion, but rather that the petition should be summarily dismissed because it was untimely. R 
123-131. 
The district court then appointed counsel for the limited purpose of addressing the 
timeliness issue. R 135. 
A hearing was held, and Mr. Oser's counsel argued that the affidavits of SAPD counsel 
established a reason for the late filing of the successive petitions - essentially that Mr. Oser filed 
his first successive petition within days of the dismissal of the appeal from the summary 
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dismissal of the original petition1 and that this filing was in accord with the advice given by 
SAPD. Counsel argued that the erroneous advice of SAPD that the successive petition must be 
filed within a reasonable time of the conclusion of the appeal from the summary dismissal of the 
original petition rather than within a reasonable time of the district court's summary dismissal of 
the petition, provided a reason for the late filing and a reason to find the current petition timely. 
Tr. p. 9, ln. 13-p. 13, ln. 25. 
The district court took judicial notice of the underlying file in the first petition and then 
summarily dismissed Mr. Oser's second successive petition as untimely. Tr. p. 15, ln. 1-21; R 
140. 
A final judgment was entered, and this appeal timely followed. R 141-145. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing the second successive petition for post-
conviction relief on the basis that it was untimely given that the petition raised a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether there was reason to allow a successive petition filed outside of the 
one-year limitation period? I.C. § 19-4908. 
1 As noted above, the record appears to support the conclusion that the first successive 
petition was filed within a month of the withdrawal of the appeal from the summary dismissal of 
the original petition. Counsel on the second successive petition stated that the first successive 
petition was filed two days before the withdrawal of the appeal of the dismissal of the original 
petition. Tr. p. 9, ln. 20-22. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing the Second Successive 
Petition Without Holding an Evidentiary Hearing to Determine Whether 
Sufficient Reason Allowed Filing Outside the One-Year Time Limit for 
Initial Petitions 
The district court erred in summarily dismissing the second successive petition for post-
conviction relief on the basis that it was untimely because the petition presented sufficient reason 
to at least require an evidentiary hearing regarding timeliness. 
If an initial petition was timely filed, a successive petition may be filed outside of the 
one-year limitation if the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was 
not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended petition. LC. § 
19-4908; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,904, 174 P.3d 870,874 (2007). Analysis of 
sufficient reason permitting the filing of a successive petition includes an analysis of whether the 
claims being made, which were not known when the original petition was filed, were asserted 
within a reasonable period of time, once those claims were known. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 
905, 174 P.3d at 875. One year has been determined to be a reasonable period of time. 
Hernandez v. State, supra. 
In Hernandez, the Court of Appeals found a successive petition filed within one year of 
the Supreme Court's determination of the appeal from the dismissal of the initial post-conviction 
petition timely under the relation-back doctrine. The Court wrote: "An allegation of ineffective 
assistance of prior-post conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient reason for permitting 
newly asserted allegations to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction application." 133 Idaho 
at 798, 992 P.2d at 793. The Court based this conclusion on the due process clause. "This is so 
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because failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to have his 
or her claims presented may be violative of due process." 133 Idaho at 799, 992 P.2d at 794, 
citing State v. Abbott, 129 Idaho 381,385,924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1996). 
The Hernandez Court adopted the reasoning of Judge Burnett's concurrence in Mellinger 
v. State, 113 Idaho 31, 740 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1987): 
[I]f a prisoner filed a timely application but it was dismissed due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel ... the prisoner would be entitled to file a subsequent 
application asserting his grounds for relief more fully even though the ... period 
of limitation ... had elapsed in the meantime. To hold otherwise would leave the 
prisoner with no alternative than to sue the attorney for malpractice - a distasteful 
and onerous undertaking - or to seek a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, 
producing the very kind of outside interference in state judicial processes that the 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act was intended to avoid. 
Mellinger, 113 Idaho at 35, 740 P.2d at 77 (Burnett concurring) (footnote omitted), as quoted in 
Hernandez, supra. 
In Hernandez, the Court placed significance on the fact that the merits of Mr. 
Hernandez's claims in the first petition were never addressed by any court. To remedy this, the 
Court reversed the order summarily dismissing the successive petition and remanded for further 
inquiry by the district court as to whether initial post-conviction counsel was ineffective. 
In Mr. Oser's case, like Mr. Hernandez's, no court has ever addressed the merits of the 
claims Mr. Oser raises in his second successive petition. Those claims were initially dismissed 
in the first successive petition as untimely and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis that the 
claims should have been presented within some unspecified period of time one year or less from 
the dismissal of the claims in the initial petition by the district court. Now, Mr. Oser has 
presented evidence that his failure to file his first successive petition within the Court of 
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Appeals' time frame was due to the advice of SAPD. 
In particular, SAPD attorney Fredericksen advised Mr. Oser that to be timely, his 
successive petition had to be filed within a reasonable time from the conclusion of appellate 
proceedings on the initial petition. This advice turns out to have been incorrect. Oser v. State, 
No. 39001. As held by the Court of Appeals, the relevant date for initiation of the reasonable 
time period was not the conclusion of appellate proceedings, but the date the original petition 
was summarily dismissed by the district court. 
Mr. Oser presented the affidavits of attorneys Fredericksen and Lehtinen in support of his 
second successive petition. Those affidavits raised a genuine issue as to whether the failure to 
file his first successive petition in a timely manner was the result of SAPD' s incorrect advice. 
His second successive petition was filed within a reasonable amount of time from the Court of 
Appeals decision affirming the dismissal of the first successive petition (less than one year). 
Charboneau, supra; Hernandez, supra. Furthermore, as in Hernandez, his claims have never 
been determined on their merits. 
IfMr. Oser is denied a forum to hear the merits of his post-conviction claims based upon 
the ineffective assistance of original post-conviction counsel and the ineffective assistance of 
appellate post-conviction counsel, his recourse will have to be a federal habeas petition filed in 
accord with Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). See also, Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 11-
56792 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2013). This will result in the kind of outside interference in state judicial 
processes that Judge Burnett discussed in Mellinger. 
Under these circumstances, the summary dismissal on the basis that the second successive 
petition was untimely was erroneous. The order of summary dismissal should be, as it was in 
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Hernandez, reversed and the matter remanded for a further inquiry including an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether the ineffective assistance of initial post-conviction counsel and 
then later appellate post-conviction counsel led to the denial of a forum to hear Mr. Oser's claims 
on their merits thus denying him his due process rights under the state and federal constitutions. 
Further if the district court does find there was an improper denial of a forum to hear the merits 
of the claims, it should allow an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the claims themselves. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Oser asks that this Court reverse the order of 
summary dismissal and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this t"p1 day of December, 2013. 
Deborah Whipple ) 
Attorney for William Oser 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on December 12., 2013, I caused two true and correct copies of the 




to: Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
10 
